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Silicone Breast Implants and Hospital
Liability: A New Forum for Hybrid
Transactions
I. Introduction
As of January 1992, an estimated one million women in the United
States have received silicone-gel filled breast implants.' A typical breast
implant consists of a "thin, transparent silicone envelope (called the
shell), filled with silicone gel, sterile saline (salt water), a combination
of the two, or aqueous gel."2 Dow Corning first marketed breast
implants in the United States in 1963. 3 Although breast implantation
was once the third most common form of plastic surgery in the country,4
the number of women receiving silicone breast implants has dramatically
declined.5 This decline reflects growing public concern about health
risks associated with silicone gel breast implants.6
1. Who Has Implants? The Estimates Vary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at C12 [hereinafter Who
Has Implants?]. See Susan McNamara, The Face of Plastic Surgery, GANNETT NEws SERV., Feb.
28, 1992 (providing statistical information which estimates that in recent years approximately
150,000 women per year have received breast implants). See also Scott Murray, Dow Coming
Discloses it has Insurance of $250 million to Cover Possible Claims, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1992
at B5 (stating that Dow Coming has sold over 600,000 silicone-gel filled breast implants).
Furthermore the studies indicate that 80% of the women who have received breast implants did so
for cosmetic purposes whereas only 20% obtained implants for reconstruction after mastectomies
or to correct congenital deformities. Who Has Implants?, at C12.
2. Breast'Implant Facts, INTERNATIONAL BREAST IMPLANT REoISTRY AND MEDIC ALERT
FOUNDATION (Turlock, CA), at 3. Breast implants can be categorized by the design and material
used for the shell and by the material that is used to fill the shell. Id. at 6. Implant shells are
generally one of three types, smooth-surfaced silicone shells, textured-surfaced silicone shells, or
polyurethane foam-coated shells. Id. at 7. Similarly the implants are filled with either silicone gel,
saline, or double lumen. Id. at 6-7. The silicone gel is a soft and flexible material whereas the
saline is simply salt water. Id. at 6. The double lumen implants contain two silicone envelopes,
one filled with saline, the other with silicone gel. Id. at 7.
3. Alison Frankel, From Pioneers to Profits: the Splendid Past and Muddled Present of Breast
Implant Litigation, THE AM. LAw., June 1992, at 82.
4. Dave Jensen, Eight Months of Nightmares Put Racine's Surgitek on the Auction Block, Bus. J.
OF MILWAUKEE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 4 (liposuction and nose operations are the two most popular
forms of plastic surgery).
5. Frankel, supra note 3, at *15. On January 6, 1992 the FDA called for a voluntary moratorium
on the use of silicone gel-filled breast implants. Id. at "15. The moratorium followed three
multimillion-dollar jury verdicts in breast implant cases against manufacturers in 1991. Id. at * 1.
See Livshits v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18445 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
19, 1991) (where the jury awarded the plaintiff $4.45 million for past pain and suffering, past and
future lost wages, and future damages). The plaintiffs in each of the above cases alleged health
problems such as arthritis, rashes, chronic fatigue and hair loss and alleged that the problems were
caused by the silicone breast implants. Frankel, supra at *7. Until the recent breast implant
.scare," the industry was approaching $500 million in sales annually. Jensen, supra note 4, at 4.
6. See Diane Brady, Fateful Choices; A Debate Rages over Silicone Breast Implants, MACLEAN'S,
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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) questioned the safety of
silicone breast implants as early as 1982. 7 The FDA, however, did not
take action in limiting their use until ten years later. Some medical
researchers believe that silicone leaking from the implants results in
health problems such as chronic infections, immune system disorders,
and fatigue.9 At present, however, there is disagreement among medical
experts as to the potential link between some women's health problems
and their breast implants." Nonetheless, a dramatic increase in the
Jan. 20, 1992, at 45.
7. Frankel, supra note 3, at *5. In 1982 the FDA proposed classifying silicone gel breast implants
as class III devices which meant that implant manufacturers would have to provide data on their
safety in order to keep them on the market. Id. at *10. The proposal was not made final until June
1988 when it was declared that silicone breast implants were Class I devices. Id. Manufacturers,
however, may have been alerted to the dangerous effects of silicone implants even sooner. Id. at
*4. Dow Coming documents released to the public on Feb. 10, 1992 revealed that Dow Coming
suspected the dangers of silicone-gel filled breast implants as early as 1960. Id. Beginning in that
year Dow Coming conducted a study on four dogs implanted with silicone gel breast prothesis. Id.
at *5. After two years, the three surviving dogs had inflammatory reaction indicative of an immune
reaction at the implant sites. Id.
8. Advisory Panel Rejects Ban on Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 7 LIABILITY WEEK, Feb. 24, 1992.
On February 20, 1992, one month after the FDA's voluntary moratorium announcement, an advisory
panel of the FDA decided against completely barring the use of silicone gel breast implants. Id.
However, the panel recommended that only women needing breast reconstruction and those women
enrolled in experimental trials should receive silicone implants. Id.
9. Dow CORNING WRIGHT, Implant Information Center: Supplemental Information to most
Frequent Questions, pg. 5-6 (Midland, MI 1991). There are two ways in which the silicone gel
contained in the breast implant can enter the body. First, the breast implants can rupture releasing
the silicone. John Schwartz, Breast Implant Settlement Enters Notification Period, WASH. POST,
April 5, 1994, at A-3. And secondly, research has shown that even in the absence of a ruptured
implant, the implant can "bleed." Bleeding occurs where minute quantities of the gel filling migrate
out into the body. Id. at 6. Some immunologists hypothesize that the silicone is then absorbed into
the lymphatic system and somehow impairs the immune system causing autoimmune diseases such
as scleroderma (a hardening and thickening of the skin often on the legs and arms), rheumatoid
arthritis (swelling and inflammation of the tissue around the joints), and/or lupus (inflammation and
damage to the connective tissues of the body that occur in sites like the skin, joints, muscles and
blood vessels). Id. at 5. See also THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AESTHETIC PLASTIC SURGERY
INC., BREAST AUGMENTATION, March 31, 1993 (stating that a small percentage of women with
breast implants have complained of chronic fatigue, joint and muscle pain, breast pain, hair loss and
dry eyes and mouth which are typical symptoms of rheumatic diseases). Furthermore, there are
suggestions that silicone breast implants may injure not only the woman who receives the implant,
but her children as well. See Sally Roberts, Second-Generation Injuries Alleged from Breast
Implants, Bus. INS., April 5, 1993, at 3. In her article, Ms. Roberts states that there are three ways
in which it is hypothesized that the gel-filled implants can hurt children: (1) the silicone can pass
through the placenta or umbilical cord during pregnancy; (2) it can cause an autoimmune disease in
the mother which in turn may cause problems with subsequent pregnancies; and (3) it can leak into
a mother's milk ducts, where it would be delivered to the children through breast-feeding. Id. at
3.
10. See generally, Dow CORNING WRIGHT, supra, note 9, at 1-9 (citing over twenty medical
studies dealing with the safety of silicone gel breast implants). See also, U-Turn on Implants?,
WASH. POST, June 20, 1994, at A14. The New England Journal of Medicine has recently published
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number of women claiming injury from their silicone implants has
resulted in an explosion of litigation."
Thousands of women showing signs of autoimmune"2 disorders are
bringing products liability suits against breast implant manufacturers 3
and physicians.' 4  Hospitals, however, appear to be plaintiffs' latest
targets." Many women allege that the hospital should be held strictly
liable or liable for breach of implied warranties for selling them defective
products. 6 Yet, whether plaintiffs will successfully prove hospital
a scientific study of women with silicone breast implants that is favorable to the manufacturers. Id.
The study indicates that there is no systematic pattern of links between the implants and the
development of serious diseases such as lupus or other autoimmnune diseases. Id.
11. Barbara Rabinovitz, Implanting Doubts; Breast Implant Cases Moving into Courts with
Questions about Links and Ltiability, MASS. LAW. WK..Y., June 28, 1993, at 37. See also, John
Schwartz, BreastnImplant Settlement Enters Notification Period, WASH. POsT, April 5, 1994, at A3.
In his article, the author explains that since the 1980's, approximately 6700 breast implant cases
have been filed against 40 manufacturers of breast implants. Id. In order to promote a speedy
resolution of breast implant cases, the federal courts have consolidated all federal cases to the
Northern District of Alabama, where the litigation is being overseen by Federal Judge Sam C.
Pointer, Jr. Id. On September 1, 1994, Judge Pointer granted final approval to a $4.25 billion
breast implant liability settlement with some of the leading implant manufacturers. John Schwartz,
$4.25 Billion Settlement in Breast Implant Suit; 90, 000 Women Agree to Terms, WASH. POST, Sept.
2, 1994, at Al. Dow Corning has agreed to commit $2 billion dollars to the settlement; thus,
making it the largest contributor. Id. Approximately 60 participating companies and more than
90,000 women have the option to agree to the terms or opt out. Id.
12. "Autoimmunity describes the condition of a misdirected immune system which reacts against
the person adversely and destroys the tissues." RICHARD SLOANE, THE SOLOANE-DORLAND
ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY (1992 Supp.).
13. It deserves mention here that the California Court of Appeals has recently held that strict
liability can not be imposed on manufacturers for the sale of defective penile prostheses and for the
sale of defective breast implants. See Huffi v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
and Artiglio v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), respectively. In both
of these cases the court ruled that the entire category of medical implants available only by resort
to the services of a physician would be immune from design defect strict liability. Artiglio, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 593. The Huffi court determined that implants were similar to prescription drugs and
thus should benefit from the same protective strictures as prescription drugs. Huffi, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 383-84. Prescription drugs have long been excepted from traditional strict liability by comment
k of section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
The exception is premised on public policy which dictates that manufacturers should not be
discouraged by the threat of a lawsuit from developing and marketing new beneficial drugs that can
save lives and reduce pain and suffering. Hufft, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 381. Note that these cases do not
contain any discussion of hybrid transactions.
14. Rabinovitz, supra note 11, at *2. See also Bill Rankin, Atlanta Lawyers at Center of Lawsuits
over Implants, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Mar. 22, 1993 at Al (claiming more than 6,000 women
have filed implant lawsuits in state and federal courts).
15. Laura Duncan, Doctors and Hospitals are New Targets for Liability in some Breast Implant
Litigation, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 18, 1993, at 1. For information pertaining to other
"targets," see Stephen Lichtenstein, A Discussion of the Silicone-gel filled Breast Implant
Controversy, 12 REv. LITio. 205-230 (1992) (discussing patient suits against manufacturers and
physicians).
16. Interview with James R. Ronca, attorney for the firm Schmidt & Ronca, Harrisburg, PA.
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liability based on these theories remains a mystery." The mystery
results from courts reaching antithetical conclusions when examining
hospital liability in hybrid transactions.
Often analogized to mass torts of the past, such as asbestos related
diseases"8 and injuries caused by Dalkon Shield 9, implant liability is
a growing concern for everyone in the chain of distribution:
manufacturers, hospitals and physicians. ° This Comment specifically
addresses the liability of hospitals for the sale of defective silicone gel
breast implants. Part II of this Comment explores the history of the
judicial analysis of hybrid transactions in three primary areas: blood
transfusion cases, the so-called instrument cases and the permanent wave
treatment cases. In part HII, the Comment explores the justification for
imposing either strict liability or breach of implied warranties on
hospitals for the sale of defective breast implants. Specifically, Part III
addresses the issue of whether a hospital is a seller of goods, the
significance of the recent proposed revision of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code [hereinafter "UCC"], the traditional goals of strict
liability, and the concept of hospitals as businesses. Part IV of the
Comment identifies the inconsistent treatment of hybrid transaction cases
in Pennsylvania jurisprudence. It further offers an opinion on the
preferred outcome of the future breast implant cases litigated before the
highest court of the state.
(Nov. 16, 1993) (stating that in Pennsylvania, some women have filed suits against hospitals based
on strict liability and implied warranty theory). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, cmt. k (1965) (defining defectiveness of a product in terms of consumer expectations of
safety). The consumer expectation test has been stated as follows, "[a] product is in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer if it is more dangerous than an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." See Knitz v.
Minster Machine Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ohio), cert. denied, sub nom. Cincinnati Milacron
Chemicals, Inc. v. Blankenship, 459 U.S. 857 (1982) (exploring the "consumer expectation test").
17. For a better understanding of these bases of liability, see infra notes 29, 30 and 100 (setting
forth elements of strict liability, implied warranty of merchantability, and implied warranty of
fitness, respectively). See generally M. James Shumaker, UCC Commentary - Blood Transfusions
and the Warranty Provisions of the UCC, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REv. 943 (1968) (discussing
the pros and cons of holding hospitals liable under implied warranty provisions); see also Charles
E. Cantu, A New Look at an Old Conundrum: The Determinative Test for the Hybrid Sales/Service
Transaction under Section 4024 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 45 ARK. L. REv. 913-37
(1992-93) (discussing the problems of hybrid transactions).
18. See Anderson, et al., The Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act: A Legislative Solution
to a Litigation Crisis, 10 J. LEO. 25 (1983). There are approximately 11,000 asbestos cases in the
United States. Id.
19. Teresa Moran Schwartz, PunitiveDamages andRegulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1335,
1352 nn. 109-12 (1993). The Dalkon Shield was an intrauterine device sold by A.H. Robins which
caused hundreds of injuries such as ectopic pregnancies, uterine perforations, and sterility. Id.
20. Joanne Wojcik, U.S. Liability System: Stopping Innovation or Promoting Safety?, Bus.
INSURANCE, Aug. 23, 1993, at 3 (discussing the need for reform of the U.S. tort system).
442
BREAST IMPLANTS
II. Background and History of Hybrid Transactions
"Hybrid transactions involve both a sale and a service in the same
transaction." 2' Article 2 of the UCC applies to the sale of goods;
Article 2, however, does not explicitly apply to a service contract.'
Thus, while Article 2 may explicitly dictate the rights, responsibilities,
warranties, and duties between parties contracting for transactions in
goods, notably absent from Article 2 is any language which would permit
the Article to govern contracts providing services or sales and services.
Accordingly, courts are mixed on whether Article 2 applies to a contract
involving the sale of both goods and services.'
The identical question arises in strict liability cases involving hybrid
transactions. Strict liability is generally imposed only where one sells a
defective product which causes injury to the ultimate user or
consumer. 24  Courts have not resolved the issue of whether strict
liability will be imposed where one sells a defective product and a
service in the same transaction.' Thus, the determinative issue that
must be resolved in suits brought against hospitals for the sale of
defective breast implants is whether the hospital is a seller or supplier of
the implants. Furthermore, a determinative question is whether breast
implants are "goods" or "products"? If the court finds that the hospital
is not a seller or supplier of the defective product then the hospital will
be held neither strictly liable nor liable for breach of implied warranties
of merchantability or fitness .'
21. Louis F. DEL DUCA, ET AL., SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 37 (1993).
22. Id. at 37.
23. See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954) (transfer of blood by a
hospital as part of a transfusion was service, not sale, and thus implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness did not arise). But cf. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1967) (transfer of blood from a blood bank to a hospital as part of a transfusion was a
transaction involving both sale and service aspects and was subject to implied warranties of the
Uniform Commercial Code), rev'd, 249 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1969) (dismissing lower court's holding on
grounds that record on appeal was too inadequate for reviewing court to rule on such an important
issue).
24. See infra note 29 for full text of 402A.
25. See Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied,
569 A.2d 1368 (Pa. 1989) (holding that defendant hospital was not strictly liable to patient under
theory of strict liability since the hospital was not in the business of selling the defective instrument
which injured the plaintiff during surgery). But see, Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266
N.E. 2d 897 (II1. 1970) (holding that hospital was engaged in the business of selling blood for
transfusion into patients and thus could be held strictly liable to plaintiff for sale of contaminated
blood).
26. For two cases in which the court held that a hospital was not a seller of blood for purposes of
a blood transfusion see Dibble v. DR. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah
1961) (concluding that hospital was not liable on breach of implied warranty theory since transfusion
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The issue of whether a hospital is considered a "seller" of breast
implants and subject to liability under theories of implied warranty or
strict liability presents a case of first impression in most jurisdictions.27
Therefore, before a court can determine the status of implants, it must
examine case law involving similar hybrid transactions. In analyzing
such transactions, however, courts have found that "the current doctrines
of implied warranty and strict liability in tort are but two labels for the
same legal right and remedy, as the governing principles are
identical. "28 This conclusion is premised on the fact that both theories
turn on whether the defendant is a "seller . . . engaged in the business
of selling such a product"29 or "if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. "I Thus, hybrid transaction cases involving strict
of blood was a service and not the sale of a product) and Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F.
Supp. 105, 108 (D. Colo. 1964) (holding that hospital was not liable for breach of warranty for
harm to patient resulting from blood transfusion because character of transfusion is service and not
a sale).
27. Duncan, supra note 15, at 1. Suits against hospitals for the sale of defective breast implants
have only recently begun to emerge. Id. at 1. In the past breast implant manufacturers have been
the principal defendants in these suits. Id. at 1. Glenn Kessler, Breast Implant Makers to Settle;
$4. 75B to be put in Global Fund, NEWSDAY, Sept. 10, 1993, at 45. In his article, the author states
that Dow Coming Corp. is the primary manufacturer of the silicone breast implant and is the
defendant in nearly 7,000 cases. Id. at 45. Despite the approved 4.25 billion dollar global
settlement among plaintiffs, manufacturers, hospitals and physicians, women would still have the
opportunity to opt-out of the settlement and pursue their own litigation suits. Schwartz, supra note
11, at Al. Thus, hospitals could still be forced to defend themselves in court.
28. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), modified, 851 F.2d 437
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 808 (D.C. App.
1970) cited in Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1133 (D.C. App. 1979)).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Generally accepted by most states, §
402A provides that
"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
"(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
"(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
"(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
"(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller."
(Emphasis added). Id.
30. UCC § 2-314 (West 1993). Section 2-314, Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of
Trade, states in pertinent part that "(1)[u]nless excluded or modified (§ 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind .... " U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (West 1993). Section 2-104(1) defines
"merchant" as a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction...
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (West 1993). Likewise, § 2-105 defines "goods" as all things (including
BREAST IMPLANTS
liability need not be analyzed separately from hybrid transaction cases
premised on breach of implied warranty of merchantability or fitness.
A. Blood Transfusion Cases
The seminal case of Perlmutter v. Beth David HospitaP is the first
of many so-called "blood transfusion" cases that explore the liability of
hospitals as "sellers" of blood.' In Perlmutter, a patient sued the
hospital for injuries resulting from the transfusing of "bad" blood.33
The patient sought to recover against the hospital on the theory that the
supplying of blood constituted a "sale" within the meaning of the Sales
Act and thus, invoked the implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability.' The court held that the contract between the hospital
and the patient was one for services and not for products.35
Furthermore, the court held that "when service predominates and the sale
is only incidental to the transaction, the transaction is not a sale within
the Sales Act."' Thus, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for
breach of implied warranty under the Sales Act, and the court dismissed
the claim against the hospital.'
The Perlmutter court also indicated its reluctance to set a precedent
for designating a hospital as an "insurer" if a patient were to suffer
specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale .... U.C.C. § 2-105 (West 1993).
31. 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
32. Id. It is interesting to note that Perlmutter was a four-to-three decision with a vigorous dissent
by Judge Froessel. Id. at 796.
33. Id. at 793. The blood used in the transfusion was sold to the plaintiff for $60.00 and was
alleged to contain "jaundice viruses and injurious substances, agents and impurities." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 794. Emphasizing its point, the court stated that a patient goes to a hospital to obtain
a course of treatment not to buy medicines or pills. Id. at 796.
36. Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 794. The court stated that "It]he supplying of blood by the hospital
was entirely subordinate to its paramount function of furnishing trained personnel and specialized
facilities in an endeavor to restore plaintiff's health." Id. at 795. The court's characterization of
the transaction came to be known as the predominant factor test. Applying this test, a court
determines the predominate factor for entering into the contract, the service or the sale of the goods.
In other words, the court looks to the nature of the agreement. In contrast to this approach is the
gravamen test which focuses on the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Thus, it is the cause of the injury
and not the nature of the agreement to which the court looks in analyzing a hybrid transaction.
However, to date, the gravamen test has only been used in the realm of contract and not tort law.
For a discussion of the two approaches to hybrid transactions, see generally Cantu, supra note 17,
at 913.
37. Id. at 796. Cantu, supra note 17, at 924-925, nn. 65, 66 (explaining that the Uniform Sales
Act was drafted in 1906 and preceded the UCC which was adopted by the commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1952). Like the UCC, the Uniform Sales Act contained provisions for
implied warranties. Id.
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adverse effects as the result of a transfusion of "bad" blood.38 At first
glance, it appears that the court partly based its decision not to hold the
hospital liable on evidence indicating that at the time of the transfusion
there was no practical method for detecting such contaminations in
blood.39  However, the court concluded that regardless of the
availability of a detection method, it would not impose liability in the
absence of negligence or other fault.'
The Perlmutter court considered the argument that a person who
becomes ill from food purchased at a restaurant can hold the restaurant
liable for breach of implied warranty of merchantability.41 However,
the court distinguished those circumstances from the facts of
Perlmutter.2  It found that in the restaurant case there is "a sale of
what is actually used" and the customer is obtaining what the restaurant
is selling, food.43 Because there is a "sale" of the food, implied
warranties attach to the transaction." But, there is no sale of blood
when a patient receives a blood transfusion at a hospital.45 Therefore,
implied warranties do not attach to the transaction."'
Other jurisdictions have cited the Perlmutter case with approval. 7
Likewise the decision has been endorsed when analyzed under strict
liability theory48
Despite its acceptance, the Perlmutter decision is not without
criticism.49  In Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,' a Florida
38. Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Temple v. Keeler, 144 N.E. 635 (N.Y. 1924)).
42. Id. at 795.
43. Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 796.
44. Id. at 795-96.
45. Id. at 796.
46. Id.
47. See Gile v. Kennewick Public Hosp. Dist., 296 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1956); Dibblee v. D.R.W.H.
Goues Latter Day Saints Hosp., 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Ctr., Inc.,
127 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1964).
48. Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
49. See Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc. 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967)
(affirming the District Court of Appeal's finding that the complaint stated a cause of action, but
reversing as premature the announcement of what would constitute a defense to the action);
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970); Hoffman v. Misericordia
Hosp. of Philadelphia, 267 A.2d 867 (Pa. 1970).
50. 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Community Blood
Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) (affirming the District Court of Appeal's finding
that the complaint stated a cause of action, but reversing as premature the announcement of what
would constitute a defense to the action).
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court departed from the "sale versus service" analysis as set forth in
Perlmutter."' Under facts similar to those of Perlmutter,52 the court
reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the complaint and concluded, "[i]t
seems to us a distortion to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist
it into the shape of a service, and then employ this transformed material
in erecting the framework of a major policy decision."" The Russell
court acknowledged the position that it would be against public policy to
hold hospitals and blood banks strictly liable when they are supplying a
commodity essential to health.' Nevertheless, the court held that as a
matter of law the supplying of blood by a blood bank to a patient for a
consideration is a sale. 5 Therefore, the law of implied warranties
applies to the transaction.
6
Between the Perlmutter and Russell decisions, the latter is more
accurate. The Russell court properly characterized the transaction
between the hospital and patient as a sale57 because there was a transfer
of a product from one entity to another for a price. 8 The hospital
transfers blood to its patient and the patient pays the hospital for the cost
of the blood. Thus, this transaction presents a sale of the blood by the
hospital or blood bank to the patient.
Agreeing with Russell, the court in Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hospital59 held that a hospital that supplied defective blood
to a patient engaged in the business of "selling" the blood.'
Consequently, the court found the hospital liable under the doctrine of
strict liability. 6' The court found that it was "simply unrealistic" to
claim that no sale occurs when blood is transferred to a patient through
51. Id. at 749.
52. The main factual difference between Perlmutter and Russell is that the plaintiff brought suit
against a blood bank, instead of a hospital, for breach of implied warranty in the sale of blood
contaminated with hepatitis. See id. at 750.
53. Id. at 752.
54. Id. at 753.
55. Russell, 185 So. 2d at 753, 756.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 753.
58. UCC § 2-106(1) (West 1993). "Sale" is defined as "the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price." Id.
59. 266 N.E.2d 897 (I11. 1970).
60. Id. at 897.
61. Id. Although the claim brought in Cunningham was based on strict liability and not implied
warranties as in Perlmutter, the analysis is identical. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp.
1048 (D.D.C. 1987), modified, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Cunningham, the plaintiff
alleged that § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was applicable because the hospital sold
her blood for purposes of the transfusion and that the blood was defective and proximately caused
her injuries. Cunningham, 266 N.E.2d at 897.
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a blood transfusion for which there is a charge.' A sale does occur in
this situation, and thus, the blood is subject to implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness.' The court also refused to make a
distinction between blood banks and hospitals, ruling that both entities
are within the distribution chain'of the blood."
The Cunningham court based its decision on the notion that a seller
of a product intended for human consumption is liable for injuries due
to the consumption of that product.' The theory of strict liability, the
court noted, is not premised on fault.' Thus, the basis of liability was
not the defendant's failure to detect the injurious substance in the
product.67 Rather, a goal of strict liability is to remove the loss from
the consumer who is entirely without fault.'
In response to cases such as Cunningham and Russell, forty-nine
states have enacted "blood shield" statutes.' "Blood shield" statutes
attempt to limit the liability of hospitals or blood banks.70 Generally,
states employ one of two methods to limit liability. First, some statutes
limit liability in blood transfusion cases to negligence actions.71 Thus,
in order to recover, plaintiffs must prove that the hospital failed to
exercise such care as an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person should
exercise under like circumstances.72 A second type of statute limits the
applicability of the UCC provisions of implied warranty through specific
addendums to the UCC as adopted by each individual state. 3 For
instance, Alabama has added a new subsection to Section 2-314 implied
warranty of merchantability provision of the Code.74  The new
subsection provides that blood transfusions and transplants constitute
62. Cunningham, 266 N.E.2d at 901.
63. Id. at 901.
64. Id. at 901.
65. Id. at 902.
66. Cunningham, 266 N.E.2d at 903. See infra pp. 23-26.
67. Id. at 903.
68. Id. at 904.
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE, 7-2-314(4) (1984); ALASKASTAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1986); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-9-802 (Michie 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. it. 6, § 2-316(5) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
672.316(5) (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-316(5) (Michie 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106,
§ 2-316(5) (Law. Co-op. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-40 (Repl. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-2-316(5) (Repl. 1979); TEX. Civ. PRAC. &REM. CODE ANN. § 77.003 (Vernon Supp. 1992);
WYO. STAT. § 34.1-2-316(c)(iv) (1991).
70. DEL DUCA, supra note 21, at 34-35.
71. 42 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 10021 (Supp. 1974).
72. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990) (defining negligence as the failure to use such
care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances).
73. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57-433.1 (Supp. 1974).
74. DEL DUCA, supra note 21, at 35 (citing ALA. CODE, tit. 7A, § 2-314(4) (Supp. 1973)).
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"rendering of services" and not a "sale" of goods." However, certain
states which have yet to enact blood shield statutes must still rely on the
obscure case law regarding blood transfusions."
As the above cases demonstrate, courts have failed to reach a
consensus as to whether a "sale" of blood occurs between the hospital
and the patient. It is important to note that state legislatures have not
taken action to protect hospitals from lawsuits involving the sale of
defective breast implants. This failure to provide protection to the
hospital for the sale of defective implants similar to the protection
afforded it by the blood shield statutes is indicative of the legislature's
view that breast implants are distinguishable from blood transfusions.
The distinction results from the fact that courts view blood transfusions
as "saving lives" and are "medically necessary" whereas courts believe
that women receive breast implants for mostly cosmetic purposes. The
argument that hospitals should not be held strictly liable for the sale of
"bad blood" because they are providing a service that is essential to
society loses its persuasion when applied to breast implants. As the
following discussion indicates, hybrid transaction cases involving
defective medical instruments are as variable as the blood transfusion
cases.
B. Instrument Cases
A second group of hybrid transaction cases consists of instances
involving injuries from surgical instruments.' In these cases, plaintiffs
seek to recover under theories of strict liability and implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness.7" As with the blood cases, the issue is
whether the hospital is a "seller" of the defective product.79
In Magrine v. Spector,' the plaintiff brought suit against her
75. Id.
76. See Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F.Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), modfled, 851 F.2d 437
(D.C. Cir. 1988). There, the plaintiffs infant son developed Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) from the transfusion of blood received at defendant hospital, and subsequently
died. The court rejected plaintiffs' causes of action, strict liability and implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness, on the ground that blood is not a product and the furnishing of blood
is a service, not a sale. Id. at 1058. Furthermore, the court stated that public policy dictated that
the hospital not be forced into the role of "insurer." Id. at 1058-1059.
77. See Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Skelton v. Druid
City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984); Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 387 A.2d 480
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989),
appeal denied, 569 A.2d 1368 (Pa. 1989).
78., Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Magrine v.
Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969).
79. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 541.
80. 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637
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dentist for gum injuries which resulted when a hypodermic needle broke
off in her mouth."' The plaintiff alleged that the dentist was both
strictly liable and liable for breach of implied warranties under the
UCC.Y In denying the plaintiff's claim of strict liability, the court held
that the dentist neither put the needle in the stream of commerce nor did
he promote its purchase by the public.'
The Magrine court explained its "stream of commerce" argument
by stating that the manufacturer is "the father of the transaction" because
he makes and places the article on the market to be sold to the public.'
Thus, the court reached the conclusion that it was not the defendant, but
rather the manufacturer, who was in the business of selling the
product.85  Therefore, the manufacturer could properly be held
liable.86 Moreover, the court concluded that the dentist was a user of
the instrument, rather than a "supplier," and thus, he could not be
strictly liable under section 402A.' The court further substantiated its
position by finding that the essence of the transaction between the dentist
and the patient does not relate to the article sold but rather to the
dentist's professional services and skill.'
The Magrine court also found that the defendant could not be held
liable for a breach of an implied warranty claim.89 In analyzing this
claim, the court noted that:
[w]arranties of fitness are regarded by law as an incident of a
transaction because one party to a relationship is in a better position
than the other to know and control the condition of the chattel
transferred and to distribute the losses which may occur because of
a dangerous condition the chattel possesses.' °
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aft'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969).
81. Id. at 539-40.
82. Id. at 540.
83. Id. at 543. The court stated that strict liability has only been imposed in New Jersey in cases
where the defendant put the product in the stream of trade and promoted its purchase by the public.
Id.
84. Id. at 541.
85. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 543.
86. Id. at 541.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, supra note 29.
88. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 543. Since the plaintiff was purchasing the dentist's services and not
a specific product, for example the needle, strict liability would not apply under the language of
§ 402A. It appears that the court is relying on the predominant factor test, Cantu, supra note 17,
at 913.
89. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 542.
90. Id. at 542 (citing Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (N.J.
1965)).
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Because the dentist was in no better position than the plaintiff to control,
inspect and discover the defect, the Magrine court reasoned that liability
was not warranted.9'
In Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital,' the court applied the
reasoning of Magrine to suits against hospitals.' The patient sued the
hospital under a strict liability theory for injuries sustained when a
surgical needle broke during surgery and permanently lodged within her
body.' The court held that hospitals, like dentists, are not engaged in
the business of selling any of the products or equipment they use in
providing medical services.95 Moreover, the hospital was a user of the
needle as opposed to a seller of such needles, thus rendering section
402A inapplicable by its very language.'
An Alabama case, Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board,' had a
fact pattern almost identical to that of Magrine and Silverhart. Despite
the similarities in these cases, the Supreme Court of Alabama did not
follow either Magrine or Silverhart. In Skelton, the plaintiff was
injured during surgery when part of a suturing needle broke off and
lodged within his body.' The issue was whether the plaintiff's
transaction with the hospital gave rise to an implied warrantyo The
court first determined that the transaction between the parties was a
typical hybrid transaction involving both "a service transaction and a
'transaction in goods.'""' The court in Skelton found that (1) the
91. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 543. In a lengthy dissent on appeal, Judge Botter stated that the patient
was the ultimate user of the needle for it is she who is exposed to the risk of the instrument.
Magrine, 241 A.2d at 642. Furthermore, he stated that because the dentist chose the needle, he was
in a better position to know the quality of the instrument and the reliability of his source of supply.
Id. at 642. The Judge also argued that this rule would have the effect of encouraging greater caution
in purchasing equipment and examining it for defects. Id. at 642.
92. 98 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
93. Id. at 187; accord Probst v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 440 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981); Easterly v. Hosp. of Texas, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Podrat v. Codman-
Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 569 A.2d 1368 (Pa. 1989).
94. Silverhart, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 188, 189.
95. Id. at 190.
96. Id. at 191. Section 402A(1)(a) states that liability will attach only to a seller who is engaged
in the business of selling such a product. See supra note 29.
97. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984).
98. Id. at 818. The different results of these cases once again reiterate the lack of uniformity of
case law among the states in the area of hybrid transactions.
99. Id. at 819.
100. ld. at 820. UCC § 2-315 (West 1993). The plaintiffs relied on the language of § 7-2-315
(identical to section 2-315 in the UCC), Implied Warranty: Fitness for a particular purpose, which
in pertinent part reads, "where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select. . . suitable goods, there is . . . an implied warranty. Id.
101. Id. at 821.
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plaintiff went to the defendant seeking medical services; (2) that he was
injured by a product sold with the services; and (3) that he was relying
on the defendant's expertise in selecting the necessary product.1"2
Thus, the court considered the hospital a "seller" of goods within the
meaning of the implied warranty provision cited and held the hospital
liable as such."t0
The court analogized this situation to a case where a funeral home
was hired to perform a burial service for the plaintiff's son."t 4 In that
case, because the vault was too small for the casket, two graveside
services had to be performed."5 There the court held that implied
warranties attached to the transaction because the funeral home knew the
purpose for which the casket was purchased."° Further, the defendant
knew that the plaintiffs were relying on the funeral home's expertise in
furnishing an appropriate casket.'
The Skelton court further justified its position by asserting that
excluding the hospital from liability would break the chain of distribution
from the manufacturer to the hospital." This break in the chain
creates an opportunity for the manufacturer to use the hospital as a
"scapegoat. "109
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that jurisdictions are not in
agreement as to the applicability of strict liability and implied warranties
to hybrid transactions. Neither the blood cases nor the instrument cases
provide assistance in reaching a conclusive decision about whether
hospitals should be held liable under these two theories for the sale of
breast implants. The next dichotomy of cases present hybrid transactions
involving the liability of beauty parlor operators for sale of defective
beauty hair treatments.
C. Hair Treatment Cases
While this third grouping of hybrid transaction cases does not
involve liability of health care organizations, they are beneficial to the
102. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 822.
103. Id. at 822. It is also interesting to note that the court stated in a footnote that it would be
illogical to exclude from liability the party that provided both a product and a service for a set price
since that party has an incentive to use inferior goods. Id. at 823 n. 2.
104. Id. at 821 citing Caldwell v. Brown Service Funeral Home, 345 So.2d 1341 (Ala. 1977)




107. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 821.
108. Id. at 823. The result would be the denial of recovery to the plaintiff. Id.
109. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 822.
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reader's understanding of the judicial analysis courts employ in resolving
hybrid transaction cases."0  One very well known hybrid transaction
case involved a suit by a beauty shop patron against her hair stylist. In
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.,"' the plaintiff suffered burns and blisters
to her head as a result of defective permanent wave solution applied to
her hair."' The plaintiff's suit rested on negligence and breach of
implied and express warranties." 3  The court held that implied
warranties did attach to the permanent wave."'
The Newmark court explained that the policy considerations which
justify imposing warranties in the case of sales are the same even where
the transaction does not technically constitute a sale. The court viewed
this transaction as supplying a product to another in a commercial
transaction."' The court further reasoned that the customer relies on
the skill and judgment of the hairdresser in selecting the products that
will be used throughout the course of the beauty treatment." 6
Moreover, the retailer should accept the loss as one of the risks of his
enterprise."' Finally, the court justified the liability of the hair stylist
by noting, "he [the retailer] profits from the transaction and is in a fairly
strategic position to promote safety through pressure on his
supplier."'s
The Newmark court specifically distinguished the Magrine case and
rejected the holding set forth in Perlmutter."9 The court distinguished
Magrine as presenting facts specific to that case." The court found
that the defective product, a hypodermic needle, was never intended to
be consumed during the dental treatment.' In Newmark, however,
110. See Orlando v. Herco, Inc., 505 A.2d 308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (where plaintiff became ill
from food provided by defendant restaurant); Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 364 A.2d 1221 (Conn. C.P.
1975) (where plaintiff claimed damage from defective construction of above ground swimming pool);
Fulwider v. Flynn, 243 N.W.2d 170 (S.D. 1976) (where plaintiff's crops were damaged from
pesticide spray used by crop dusters).
111. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 246 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1968), cert. granted, 247 A.2d 886 (N.J.
1968), and aff'd, 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
112. Id. at 13. The plaintiff claimed that she suffered a burning sensation on her head while under
the blow dryer at the salon and left the beauty parlor with a headache. She further stated that the
following day her forehead was red and blistery. Id.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Id. at 15.
116. Newmark, 246 A.2d at 15.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. at 16.
121. Magrine, 227 A.2d at 539.
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the permanent wave solution was a product that was permanently
transferred to the plaintiff and remained intact. "
In rejecting Perlmutter, the Newmark court looked to the prior New
Jersey decision of Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital.'23 The Jackson
court disagreed with Perlmutter's holding that the furnishing of blood in
a transfusion did not constitute a sale." Thus, the Newmark court
relied on precedent in declining to follow Perlmutter.'25
The Newmark case illustrates the different approaches that courts
have taken in resolving the question of whether a particular transaction
represents a sale of products, services, or both. Newmark stands in
contrast to a decision rendered by a Connecticut court five years earlier.
In Epstein, ' which involved facts similar to those of Newmark, the
court faced the issue of whether the use of products involved in the
course of beauty treatment constituted a sale of such products.127 The
court failed to find a sale of the hair dye solution and refused to hold that
implied warranties governed the transaction.'28  Here, the court
concurred with the Perlmutter decision and adopted the theory that if the
transfer of personal property is incidental to the transaction, then the
transaction is not a sale under the UCC. 29 Because the plaintiff paid
for the services of the defendant, the court did not find a sale of the hair
dye solution."3 The court also relied on its prior holdings inMolving
the service of food. 3' In those cases, the service was the thing
purchased and not the food." Therefore, implied warranties did not
attach to the transaction. 133
The discussion of the various blood, instrument and permanent wave
cases indicates that there is no uniform consensus on the treatment of
hybrid transaction cases. Some courts hold that UCC implied warranties
122. Newmark, 246 A.2d at 16.
123. Id. at 16 (citing Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1967), rev'd, 249 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1969) (dismissing lower court's holding on grounds that record on
appeal was too inadequate for reviewing court to rule on such an important issue)).
124. Jackson, 232 A.2d at 879.
125. Newmark, 246 A.2d at 16.
126. Epstein v. Giannattasio, 197 A.2d 342 (Conn. C.P. 1963).
127. Id. at 342.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 344.
130. Id. at 345.
131. Epstein, 197 A.2d at 344 (citing Albrecht v. Rubinstein, 63 A.2d 158, 160 (Conn. 1948) and
Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 167 A.99 (Conn. 1933)). In Albrecht and Lynch the courts held that
services rather than food are sold to a patron when served at a restaurant. But cf. Temple v. Keeler,
144 N.E. 635 (N.Y. 1924).
132. See Albrecht, 63 A.2d at 158; Lynch, 167 A. at 99).
133. Epstein, 197 A.2d at 342.
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and strict liability apply to transactions involving sales of both services
and products. Other courts, however, refuse to recognize these causes
of action where the product aspect is negligible in comparison to the
service aspect. In deciding whether strict liability and breach of implied
warranty actions are applicable to hybrid transactions, the most important
consideration should be the goals of these claims. If applying strict
liability and implied warranty theories to hybrid transaction cases would
further the goals of those theories, courts should include hybrid
transactions within the scope of those transactions which receive
warranty protection. 134
III. Justification for Hospital Liability Based on Strict Liability and
Breach of Implied Warranty for Sale of Defective Breast Implants
The foregoing discussion illustrates the lack of uniformity among
jurisdictions in applying the doctrines of strict liability and implied
warranty to hybrid transaction cases. However, the Perlmutter decision
has greatly influenced this body of law. 135  Each state's decision to
either adopt or reject the reasoning of this case controls later decisions
in new fact scenarios. Yet the facts of each hybrid transaction case
require new analysis. In addition, the states must determine whether this
influential, though perhaps outdated, case should govern the issue of
whether implied warranties and strict liability will attach to transactions
involving both a sale and service. The novel case of breast implantation
necessitates a fresh look at hybrid transactions, specifically whether a
hospital constitutes a seller of silicone gel breast implants.
As stated earlier, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
imposes strict liability only on sellers of products engaged in the business
of selling such products.' 3  Likewise, implied warranties of
134. See infra pp. 23-26.
135. The Perlmutter case, 123 N.E.2d at 792, is addressed in: Easterly, 772 S.W.2d at 211;
Cunningham, 266 N.E.2d at 897; Shepard, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 132; Magrine, 227 A.2d at 539;
Probst, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 2; Hoffman, 267 A.2d at 867; Russell, 185 So. 2d at 749; Dibblee, 364
P.2d at 1085; Gile, 296 P.2d at 662; Koenig, 127 N.W.2d at 50; Gulash, 364 A.2d at 1221;
Newmark, 246 A.2d at 11.
136. § 402A RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 29; Comment f elaborates on what
is meant by "in the business of selling" by stating that:
It [§402A] applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or
consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any
wholesale or retail dealer of distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant. It is not
necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such products. Thus
the rule applies to the owner of a motion picture theatre who sells popcorn or ice cream,
either for consumption on the premises or in packages to be taken home.
Id.
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merchantability and fitness will apply only where there is a sale of goods
by a merchant who deals in goods of the kind.137 Section 402A does
not reach service providers138 nor does Article 2 of the UCC apply to
the sale of services. 139 Thus, for a woman who has received defective
breast implants to be successful in a suit against a defendant hospital, she
must prove both that the hospital sold the breast implants and that the
hospital was engaged in the business of selling implants. There are
several reasons why jurisdictions should depart from the Perlmutter
reasoning in cases involving implants and should impose such liability on
hospitals when they sell defective silicone gel breast implants.
A. The Hospital is a Seller of Breast Implants
1. Contrast of Breast Implant Cases with Blood Transfusion Cases
and Medical Implantation Device Cases.-The key to the court's denial
of liability for breach of implied warranty in Perlmutter rested on the
determination that the hospital acted as a seller of medical services and
not of products.' In the case of Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center,'4' a California Appeals Court relied on the Perlmutter
reasoning in denying a patient's claim against a hospital for implantation
of a defective pacemaker. 2  Citing Perlmutter, Silverhart, and
Magrine, the court held that the hospital furnished services to the patient
in order to make him healthy. 3 The hospital provided the pacemaker
as part of a course of treatment which it did not provide to the general
public.'" Furthermore, the court reiterated the Silverhart "essence
test" and found that the essence of the relationship between the hospital
137. Forty-nine states have adopted the UCC. For the full text of UCC 2-314 Implied Warranty
of Merchantability and UCC 2-315 Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, see supra
notes 30 and 100 respectively.
138. Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
139. UCC § 2-102 (West 1993) (defining the scope of the article). The article applies to
transactions in goods. Id. For a definition of goods, see supra note 30. Thus if agreement is not
for a "transaction in goods," then the UCC provisions of Article 2 would not apply.
140. Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
141. 225 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. App. 2d 1986).
142. Id. The breast implant case and the Hector case are factually very similar because they both
involve implantation of a defective product into the patient. Therefore it would seem that the
Perlmutter reasoning adopted by the Hector court is also applicable to the breast implant case.
However, the nature of these two pr-oducts are very different in that pacemakers serve medical
purposes whereas breast implants largely serve cosmetic purposes. Thus, Perlmutter is not
applicable to the breast implant scenario.
143. Id. at 602.
144. Id. at 599.
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and the patient was one of medical services'45 rather than the sale of
the instruments used in providing such services.46
Breast implant cases can be distinguished from both blood
transfusion cases and pacemaker cases. The basis of this distinction is
that the blood in Perlmutter and the pacemaker in Hector are products
essential to the patient's livelihood. Thus, there is an extremely strong
public policy reason for denying strict liability in cases involving such
indispensable products." The same cannot be said of breast implants.
In breast implant cases, a woman seeks a product that the hospital
provides. She is not seeking medical treatment, 48 but rather a specific
product only obtainable through the hospital. Generally, the primary
function of a hospital is to heal.4 9 In most implant cases, however,
the woman obtains breast implants for cosmetic purposes."5 Thus, she
has not come to the hospital for the purpose of "being healed."'
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that the hospital is not a seller of
the implant when the hospital provides a product to its patient for a
price. 52 In most cases, the patient receives a charge on her hospital
bill specifically for the sale of the implant.'53 This charge is separate
from the cost of the services provided by the physicians and hospital
staff."' 4 Courts have disputed whether a specific charge for a product
145. Id.
146. Hector, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt k, states that:
[tihere are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
As with drugs, blood and pacemakers are products that are not unreasonably dangerous due to their
essential function in saving lives.
148. Interview with James Ronca, supra note 16.
149. Easterly v. Hosp. of Texas, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
150. Who Has Implants?, supra note 1, at C12. Eighty percent of women get breast implants for
cosmetic purposes. Id. In a California case involving suit against a manufacturer for the sale of
defective breast implants, the court held that the aspect of cosmetic improvement does not justify
eliminating breast implants from exemption from strict liability. Artiglio v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.
Rptr.2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
151. There is an exception of course with the case of a mastectomy. There the woman has initially
sought treatment at the hospital for breast cancer.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. f, supra note 136. As stated in comment
f, the hospital does not have to be solely engaged in selling the product. Id. The hospital could still
be a "seller" of breast implants even if it was also selling other products and services.
153. Telephone interview with Dr. James Yates, physician of the Plastic Surgery Center Ltd. &
The Center for Cosmetic Surgery, Camp Hill, PA (Oct. 14, 1993); Rabinovitz, supra note 11, at
*3 (stating that implants range in price from $ 1,200 for a pair of saline expanders to approximately
$ 1,500 for a pair of silicone implants).
154. Interview with Dr. James Yates, supra note 153.
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while in the hospital evidences a sale of that product. The next two
cases illustrate this debate.
In Providence Hospital v. Truly,'55 the court held that a hospital
could be held liable for breach of implied warranty where a product
injured the plaintiff during surgery. 5 6 The patient sued the hospital for
eye injuries caused by a contaminated drug solution. 57 In holding that
the hospital was a seller of the product, the court relied on evidence
showing that the hospital specifically itemized the cost of the drug used
during cataract surgery on the patient's bill. 5 It reasoned that the
inclusion of the cost of the drug in her hospital bill indicated a "sale" of
the drug had taken place between the hospital and the patient.
Accordingly, the hospital could be held liable.'59 The Hector court,
however, declined to follow this approach." 0
In reaching its holding, the Hector court considered evidence that
the hospital made a profit from the sale of the pacemaker. 16' It
concluded that even though the hospital had added an 85 % surcharge to
the pacemaker on the patient's bill, this did not amount to a "sale" of the
pacemaker. 62 The money was not a profit to the hospital but rather
"part of an overall scheme . . . to cover[] the hospital's projected
expenditures[].""' 3  Not only are breast implant cases distinguishable
from blood transfusion cases premised on strict liability as illustrated in
the foregoing discussion, but they also stand in contrast to health care
cases premised on negligence.
A breast implant case can also be distinguished from an instance
where the doctor or hospital is at fault for tortious conduct resulting from
the performance of professional services."'4 The plaintiff in Barbee v.
Rogers brought suit against his optometrists on a breach of warranty
theory and strict liability theory."6  The plaintiff claimed that he
sustained eye damage from an incorrect prescription and contact lenses
which were improperly fitted."ls The court held that the plaintiff's
155. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Stewart Title
Guaranty Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
156. Id. at 131.
157. Id. at 129, 130.
158. Id. at 131.
159. Id. at 131.
160. Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595, 601 (Cal. App. 2d 1986).
161. Id. at 600.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex. 1968).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 343.
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claims failed because the damage was "not attributable to the product
itself, for example the contact lenses, but to the professional and
statutorily authorized act of 'measuring the powers of vision' of
Petitioner's eyes.""6 Since the product sold was not defective, the
statutory language of section 402A and UCC sections 2-314 and 2-315
was inapplicable.'"
In contrast to Barbee, a plaintiff who sues a hospital for defective
breast implants is not claiming that the hospital staff improperly
performed its professional services. Rather, the plaintiff alleges that the
product itself is defective.'" Therefore, as a seller of a defective
product, the hospital should be liable under strict liability theory and
implied warranty theory.
2. Contrast of Breast Implant Cases with Instrument Cases. -The
so-called "instrument" cases are also distinguishable by their very
facts. 7°  In Podrat, for instance, a product that was used by the
hospital staff in providing medical services injured the plaintiff.'' In
denying plaintiff's claim against the hospital, the Podrat court determined
that the defective surgical forceps were used in furtherance of "services,"
and that the hospital was not in the "business of selling."' 72 The title
of the product was not passed on to the patient, nor was the patient
seeking to obtain the instrument.'73 With breast implants, however, the
woman enters the hospital specifically to obtain the product. Although
the services performed by the hospital are a necessary part of the
acquisition, it is the tangible product itself, rather than the services that
a woman seeks to procure. Furthermore, title passes from the hospital
to the patient at the time of implantation. 74 Both the passage of the
implant's title from the hospital to the patient and the purpose of the
167. Id. at 346.
168. Id.
169. Cantu, supra note 17, at 933-36. The gravamen test supports the conclusion that where the
injury results from the products and not the service, the product should be subject to implied
warranties. Id. at 935. Since in the case of most breast implant litigation the injury is caused by
silicone leaking into the woman's body rather than the actual surgery, implied warranties should
attach.
170. See supra notes 77 & 80.
171. Podrar, 558 A.2d at 895. The facts indicate that during surgery for a herniated lumbar disc,
the tip of a pituitary forcep used by the physician broke off and lodged within the space. Id. at 895.
172. Id. at 897.
173. Id. at 897.
174. See UCC § 2-401(2) (West 1993). This section states that, "[tlitle passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery
of the goods . . . ." Id. Thus, in the case of breast implants, title passes at the time of surgery
since this is when the physical goods are delivered.
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woman's hospital visit provide evidence that a sale of the product has
occurred.
B. Proposed Article 2 Revision of the UCC Expands the Scope of
Liability
A proposed revision of Article 2 of the UCC lends further support
to the proposition that hospitals can be liable under a warranty theory as
sellers of breast implants.'75 Established by the American Law
Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, the proposal appears to resolve the dispute concerning the
applicability of implied warranty provisions in sales involving hybrid
transactions. 
176
Proposed section 2-103 of the UCC, titled "Scope of the Article,"
states
"(a) Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to:
(1) any transaction, regardless of form, that creates a
contract for the sale of goods, including a contract in
which a sale of goods predominates;
(2) any dispute relating to the quality of goods supplied
under a contract in which the sale of goods does not
predominate; and
(3) any dispute arising under a contract for sale which
obligates the seller to install, customize, service, repair, or
replace goods at or after the time contracting."'"
This language would result in the applicability of the UCC
provisions of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability to any
contract which involves the sale of a product and a service. Even if one
could argue that the sale of the product was incidental to the attainment
of the service, the provisions of the revised article would still apply.
Although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has not passed this draft, the mere fact that the proposal contains
this language indicates the need for uniformity and finality in the area of
hybrid transactions. From the proposed language, one can infer that the
authors of the proposal favor a bright-line rule allowing attachment of




implied warranties whenever there is a sale of a service and a product in
the same transaction.1 78
C. Hospital Liability and Traditional Goals of Strict Liability and
Breach of Implied Warranty are Compatible
Imposing liability on hospitals for the sale of defective breast
implants serves a valid purpose. Characterizing hospitals as "sellers" in
this situation furthers the policy considerations of strict liability179 and
implied warranty law." This section discusses the goals of strict
liability in the context of breast implant cases.
Courts first imposed strict liability on manufacturers because they,
by marketing their products for use and consumption, undertook a special
responsibility toward the consuming public.' The court acted "to
insure that the costs resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers [] rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves. " "' Courts soon extended strict liability to
everyone in the chain of distribution, including suppliers, distributors,
wholesalers and retailers."sa The following paragraphs examine the
policy considerations for extending strict liability to retailers. The
extension of strict liability to hospitals for the sale of defective breast
implants serves these policies.
First, the imposition of strict liability on retailers creates an
incentive for safety. 1 heir position in the marketing process enables
them to exert pressure on the manufacturer to enhance the safety of the
product." Imposing strict liability on hospitals for the sale of
defective breast implants would further this policy. Most often, the
hospital has a contract with a specific manufacturer of breast
implants, 86 and thus can pressure the manufacturer into providing safe
178. The authors easily could have adopted the Perlmuner view and predominant factor test where
implied warranties would not attach if the sale of the product were incidental to the service. See
generally Perlmuner, 123 N.E.2d at 792.
179. See infra notes 181-98 and accompanying text.
180. See supra p. 11 and note 90.
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c (1965).
182. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
183. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210 (11. 1983).
184. Id. at 210.
185. Id.
186. Interview with Karen Drayton, employee of the Temple University Clinic of Plastic Surgery,
Philadelphia, PA (Oct. 14, 1993). According to Ms. Drayton, the transactions occur as follows:
the hospital contracts with various implant manufacturers since all of the companies do not carry the
same type of implant and the physician then places the order on an "as needed" basis. Id. There
is variation in this sequence, for at some hospitals the hospital personnel places the order directly.
Interview with Dr. James Yates, supra note 153.
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products by refusing to purchase and in turn sell dangerous implants to
patients.
A second policy consideration for extending strict liability to
retailers is that retailers may be the only members of the marketing chain
available for redress."s It is possible that plaintiffs may be unable to
recover from breast implant manufacturers because such corporations
may become bankrupt as a result of litigation costs arising from breast
implant suits."s  Thus, plaintiffs should be able to recover from the
hospital.
Third, the retailer can better prevent the circulation of defective
products." 9 This justification for extending strict liability to retailers
is especially true with regard to hospitals. Hospitals can effectively
impede the circulation of defective breast implants because an
individual's purchase of breast implants directly from the manufacturer
would be utterly useless.
Another reason why courts have justified extending liability to
retailers is because the cost of compensating injuries from a defective
product can be properly allocated through the retailer's business." °
Extending liability to hospitals is consistent with this reasoning. The
hospital's ability to distribute the cost of compensating injured women
through the purchase price of the breast implants should subject it to
liability.
191
Consumer expectation or reliance also provides a traditional
justification for imposing strict liability and breach of implied warranty
187. See Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1977) (discussing the extension
of strict liability beyond manufacturers). In Francioni the plaintiff, a truck driver, was injured when
his vehicle went off the road and plunged to the bottom of an embankment. Id. at 737. The
plaintiff sued the trucking corporation on theories of negligence and strict liability pursuant to §
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. Finding for the plaintiff, the court held that strict
liability extends to all suppliers of products who supply products for use or consumption by the
public. Id. at 740.
188. Who has Implants?, supra note 1, at C12. There have been more than a dozen breast implant
manufacturers since the devices were first used but most have gone out of business. Id. Dow
Coming estimates that it has 30 percent of the market as does Mentor Corp. Id.; Andrew Blum,
Implant Makers, Insurers Feud; Duty to Defend at Issue, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993 at 3. In his
article, the author states that Mentor Corp., a small manufacturer of silicone breast implants, has
incurred more than $ 4.5 million in breast implant defense costs. Id. Furthermore, Mentor spent
$ 600,000 against its insurer who refuses to make any contributions toward Mentor's breast implant
litigation defense costs. Id.; Judge Approves Settlement on Mentor Breast Implants, 8 LIABILITY
WEEK 29, July 12, 1993 (in 1991 Dow Coming was ordered to pay $ 7.3 million to one implant
recipient).
189. Francioni, 372 A.2d at 736.
190. Id.
191. See infra notes 199-224 (examining hospitals as profit-oriented businesses).
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on sellers of defective products.1" In Skelton v. Druid City Hospital,
the court made a compelling argument when it stated:
Patients are rarely in a position to judge the quality of the medical
supplies and other goods sold to them and used in their care; often,
those supplies are of an inherently dangerous nature. The complete
dependence of patients on the staff of a hospital to choose fit products
for their care justifies the imposition of an implied warranty under §7-2-3 15.19
The reasoning of the Skelton court is applicable to the case of breast
implants. Most women probably know little about the breast implants
they will receive. They may read brochures provided by the surgeon or
hospital, but essentially women rely on the hospital to choose the safest
implantation devices available. A hospital that holds itself out as having
expert knowledge on the products used in the institution should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from the defective product. The cost should not
fall on the innocent woman who places herself in the capable hands of
the hospital.
The previously discussed Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. case also relied
on the consumer expectation rationale."9 In imposing liability on the
beauty shop operator, the court said that the customer is a passive
recipient of the product, whereas the beauty parlor operator has the
control over and selection of such products used on the customer.195
Furthermore, it determined that the patron expects that the product is
reliable and trusts that it will not injure her.1" Similarly, patients rely
on the judgment of health-care providers. Patients expect health care
workers to provide them with safe medical products." Women expect
that the breast implants they receive will enhance their figures. They do
not foresee complications such as chronic fatigue, joint and muscle pain
and hair loss caused by defective silicone implants."
192. William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing between Products and Services in Stn'ct Liability, 62
N.C. L. REv. 415, 427 (1984).
193. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 823 (Fla. 1984).
194. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 246 A.2d 11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1968), cert. granted, 247
A.2d 886 (N.J. 1968), and aff'd, 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Duncan, supra note 15, at 1.
198. Frankel, supra note 3, at *1.
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D. Hospitals: Healers, Businesses or Both?
It appears that the disagreement regarding hospital liability in the
realm of hybrid transactions stems from the courts' reluctance to hold
hospitals strictly liable pursuant to 402A or breach of implied
warranty. 9'9  In Dibblee v. DR. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints
Hospital,2' the court stated:
[p]ractically all hospitals are bourns of mercy and most physicians are
unselfish disciples of relief and the cure of human ills. We think of
hospitals not as profit-seeking vendors in the market place as might
be attributed to General Foods, General Motors, chain stores, super
druggeries, national restaurants, or a cereal company that appeals to
muscle-building qualities of its food."0
The court then concluded that hospitals may be held liable under a
negligence theory but not under a theory of strict liability.2' The
court's rationale was that a hospital does not function as a traditional
business.2 'u The perception that hospitals are not businesses induces
courts to resist the extension of hospital liability beyond negligence. The
logic appears to be as follows: A general purpose for imposing strict
liability on businesses is that they are profiting from the sale of the
product and thus, are in the best position to redistribute the cost of
compensating the injured.' Because the goal of hospitals is to heal,
and not to profit, hospitals cannot afford to pay the cost of such injuries.
Therefore, strict liability should not be imposed on hospitals.
This rationale has its flaws. Modern hospitals are in many ways
profit-driven businesses. Today's hospitals have come a long way from
their once charitable immunity status,' 5 and although they may still be
199. Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
Although the true issue, as stated earlier, is whether the hospital is a seller of the breast implant, it
appears that the courts' decision to impose liability in very few of the hospital cases is largely
influenced by the characterization of a hospital as a place of healing and not a business.
200. 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961).
201. Id. at 1087.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c (1965).
205. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 133, at 1069
(5th ed. 1984). Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century charities were considered not liable in tort.
Id. at 1069. Charities included almost all "non-profit" organizations, and hospitals were the most
important group. Id. at 1070. Today, however, such immunity has been abolished in most states.
Id.; see generally 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952) (providing state by state analysis); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979) (stating that most jurisdictions have abolished charitable
immunity).
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categorized as "traditional institution[s] of healing and mercy, " 1°6
hospitals also have business characteristics.7 Like other businesses
that comprise part of the chain of distribution of a product, hospitals are
in a position to compensate those injured from the sale of its harmful
products.
A business is defined as a "profit-seeking enterprise or
concern. "I If the statistics gathered in a report on Arizona hospitals
represent hospitals nationwide, then most modern hospitals can be
considered profit-seeking enterprises. ' The statistics indicate that a
hospital may earn a net income as high as 25.3 million dollars per
year.210 The figures also show that the high revenues allow the
hospital to pay its executives well. For example, executives at the
largest healthcare systems in the state of Arizona earn between $170,000
to $347,000.211 This data indicates that while hospitals may be in the
business of caring, they certainly derive a high profit margin from the
services and products that they sell. As of 1992, health care accounted
for about 13 percent of the nation's gross national product.212 Thus,
imposing strict liability on hospitals for selling defective products does
not seem unreasonable in light of their ability to pay. Of course, it is
recognized that all hospitals may not be as profitable as others, but the
same inequity exists in the business world.
Recently, the federal government questioned the tax exempt status
of not-for-profit hospitals. 2 3  This probe serves as another indication
that hospitals can be characterized as businesses in some instances.
Hospitals and other not-for-profit organizations, like health maintenance
organizations, may soon lose their tax exempt status because of recent
research revealing that they do not provide enough free care.214  The
206. Dibblee, 364 P.2d at 1087.
207. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 822. The Supreme Court of Alabama has stated that whether
profitable or not, hospitals are businesses. Id.
208. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DIcTIONARY 183 (Revised ed. 1975).
209. Angela Gonzales, Health Chiefs Pay Revealed: Local Execs'Pay Lags far Behind National
Average, THE Bus. J., Aug. 13, 1993, at 1.
210. Id. at *5.
211. Id. at *1. These salaries are even lower than those paid to persons working in comparable
positions in other areas of the country. Id.
212. Hospitals: Region's Money Muscle, PHiLA. Bus. J., Nov. 9, 1992, at 1. The figure is
expected to grow to 17.4 percent by the end of the decade according to the federal Health Care
Financing Administration. Id.
213. Carol Sardinha, Kaiser Hearing Opens Forum Debate on Charity Care Standard, MANAGED
CARE OUTLOOK, June 4, 1993.
214. The Wealth of Hospitals, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 1993, at A6. The theory is that if
hospitals are receiving tax-exempt status then they should provide free health care services to the
poor equal to the amount of their exemption. Id. Nancy Kane of the Harvard School of Public
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discovery of the financial status of the country's largest health
maintenance organization led to the wide publication of the possible loss
of this tax exempt status.215
Kaiser Permanente, a California health maintenance organization,
recently fell under attack for not providing enough free health care. 216
In 1992, Kaiser earned revenues of $11 billion and a net income of $796
million.217 Interestingly, Kaiser ranked first out of twenty of the
nation's largest "not-for-profit" health care systems but last in the
amount of free care provided to the poor.2"8  Thus, serious questions
are raised as to whether not-for-profit healthcare systems should be
allowed to maintain their tax-exempt status. Perhaps Congress will
follow the lead of the Texas Legislature, which enacted a law requiring
private not-for-profit hospitals to provide charity care equal to 4% of
their net revenues or 100% of their tax benefits.219
This move toward denying hospitals their tax-exempt status
strengthens the argument that modem hospitals, in some instances,
function similarly to ordinary business enterprises. As ordinary business
enterprises, hospitals should be subject to strict liability and breach of
implied warranty when they sell defective breast implants.
There are other indications that hospitals have "business-like" traits.
Some hospitals add a surcharge to the cost of the implant, other than
shipping fees from the manufacturer, and thus derive a profit from the
sale of the actual breast implant.' Because hospitals derive a profit
from the sale, they can pay money to compensate victims who have
incurred serious injuries from defective implants. Moreover, hospitals
Health has done a study which shows that some hospitals in the Boston area have enormous amounts
of financial resources. Id. She also discovered that some hospitals were understating their
surpluses, and that Boston's twelve teaching hospitals had more than $1.1 billion in unrestricted
cash. Id. This cash build up, however, has been of little benefit to the public in general. Id. One
area hospital had more than $329 million in unrestricted cash yet it paid nothing to the city of
Boston. Id.
215. See generally, Kathleen Day, Kaiser Permanente's Tax Break Challenged; Critics say
H.M.D., usually touted as, WASH. POST, May 29, 1993, at B13; Sardinha, supra note 213 at *1.
216. Day, supra note 215, at B13.
217. Id.
218. Id. A January survey showed that in 1991 Kaiser only provided 0.2 percent of its net
revenues in free care. Sardinha, supra note 213, at *1. Wendy Krasner, an attorney of the law firm
McDermott Will & Emery, Washington, D.C. stated that when a non-profit like Kaiser earns billion
in revenues, "you really have to wonder if (the present system) is equitable. It's a misnomer to say
non-profits make no profits." Id. at *3.
219. See Sandy Lutz, Texas Sets Standard for Not-For-Profits, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 31,
1993 at 4. The new law requires 95 of Texas' 130 private, not-for-profit hospitals to increase the
amount of charity care they are currently providing. Id.
220. Interview with James Ronca, supra note 16.
BREAST IMPLANTS
have a cost incentive to contract with an implant manufacturer for
implants at a relatively low price,"' increasing their profit margin.m
Therefore, strict liability and implied warranty law should apply to a
transaction involving the sale of defective breast implants from a hospital
to its patient.
As stated previously, a major public policy reason for imposing
strict liability on sellers is that they market the defective product and
reap the profits from the sale of the product. m Like businesses that
sell the latest sneaker or automobile, surgeons advertise their ability to
enhance a woman's appearance and self-confidence through breast
augmentation.' They promote the sale of breast implants often to
healthy women who are not otherwise in "need" of medical services.
The result of such advertising is an increased number of women seeking
breast augmentation which, in turn, translates to higher profits for the
hospital. Thus, like any other business that sells a defective product
causing injury to a consumer, hospitals should be held strictly liable or
liable for breach of implied warranty when they place defective silicone
breast implants in women.
IV. Hospital Liability in Relation to Hybrid Transactions is Unsettled
Law in Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue of
whether hospitals can be held strictly liable and/or liable for breach of
implied warranty for the sale of a defective product.' Thus, as in
many other jurisdictions, "[]it is a horse race in the area of hybrid
transactions. "2 In Webb v. Zern,27  the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania adopted section 402A of the Restatement of Torts.'
221. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 823, n.2 (Ala. 1984).
222. Id.
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c (1965).
224. Brief for Plaintiffs at 37, Ford v. McGhan Medical Corp., et al., No. 135, slip op. (C.P. Ct.
of Philadelphia County, April Term, 1992). A pamphlet handed out by a Pennsylvania plastic
surgeon states in part:
Everyone wants to have a well-proportioned pleasing silhouette. All of the classic
beauties of the world have had firm, lifted breast that give balance and symmetry to the
waist and hip. There is no question that prosthetic surgery of the breast can result in a
more pleasing appearance and a rebirth of self-confidence.
Id.
225. Eby v. Milton Hershey Medical Ctr., 113 Dauph. County 158 (1993) (explaining that the
court was unwilling to grant defendant hospital summary judgment since the question of hybrid
transactions in Pennsylvania has not yet been resolved).
226. DEL DUCA, supra note 21, at 38.
227. 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966).
228. Id. The court adopted the same language as that set forth in the 1965 Restatement (Second)
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Furthermore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court broadly interprets section
402A, 9 and has extended liability to all sellers in the distribution
chain.2' However, courts have not uniformly applied this section to
hybrid transactions. There are seven relevant decisions discussing the
applicability of section 402A and implied warranties to hospitals in this
particular area of law.
The principal Pennsylvania case concerning blood transfusions is
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital of Philadelphia.1  In Hoffman, the
administrator of decedent's estate alleged that the hospital "sold" the
decedent blood contaminated with the hepatitis virus, which ultimately
caused her death.' Plaintiff based the action on the alleged breach of
implied warranty of fitness and merchantability by the hospital. 3 The
court acknowledged the Perlmutter reasoning' but held that even if it
were ultimately determined that the transfer of blood from the hospital
to the patient is a service, recovery would still be permissible on a
breach of implied warranty claim.?51
Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,' an "instrument" case,
was followed by Hoffman.' While undergoing surgery at Albert
Einstein Medical Center, -the plaintiff incurred serious injuries.'
During a back operation, the surgeon's power drill slipped and
penetrated the plaintiff's spinal cord rendering her a quadriplegic. 9
At the end of a trial lasting several weeks, the jury found in favor of the
of Torts.
229. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975) (where the Court
eliminated the requirement that the defective product be unreasonably dangerous).
230. Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 242 A.2d 231, 236 (Pa. 1968).
231. 267 A.2d 867 (Pa. 1970).
232. Id. at 868.
233. Id. at 868.
234. Id. at 869. The court provided its interpretation of the Permutter logic as follows:
1. Implied warranties arise in sales transactions.
2. This transaction is not a sale.
3. Therefore, no implied warranties arose.
Id.
235. Id. at 870. The court stated, "... [i]t cannot be said with certainty that no recovery is
permissible upon the claim here made, even if it should ultimately be determined that the transfer
of blood from a hospital for transfusion into a patient is a service." Id.
236. 387 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
237. Id. This opinion did not command the vote of a majority of the judges. Id. Six judges
participated in the decision of the case. Id. Two judges concurred in the result but would not hold
the hospital strictly liable. Id. Two judges dissented and found error in charging the jury that the
hospital could be liable under § 402A. Id.
238. Id. at 483, 484.
239. Id. at 484.
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plaintiff and against all of the defendants.' The defendant hospital,
Albert Einstein Medical Center, appealed from a finding of strict
liability. However, the appeal was to no avail.Ul In upholding the
liability of the hospital the court stated:
[tihe surgical patient is without control over the procedures and
instruments used upon him. His health and future safety are at the
mercy and skill of the treating physicians and the instruments he
employs. It is elementary that if a hospital supplies equipment to an
operating physician the hospital must appraise themselves of the risks
involved and adopt every effort to insure the safety of the equipment
chosen.4 2
Subsequent to Grubb was Flynn v. Langflitt, 3 a federal court
decision interpreting Pennsylvania law." The Flynn court dismissed
a cause of action based on strict liability against a hospital for injuries
that a patient incurred while he was there.us Specifically, the plaintiff
alleged that he contracted a form of meningitis" as the result of a
tissue graft.4 7 In disregarding Grubb, the court first pointed out that
although the Grubb opinion was unanimous as to the result, four of the
six judges dissented as to the use of section 402A against the
hospital.' Additionally, it rationalized that the highest court of the
state had not spoken on the issue. 9 Therefore, no precedent dictated
that the court had to find in favor of the plaintiff.2'
In the next instrument case heard in Pennsylvania, a court reached
a decision that directly opposed the Grubb decision 5" The Podrat
court disregarded Grubb because the opinion, which held the hospital
strictly liable, was not joined by a majority of the participating
judges- 2  The court then looked to the case law of neighboring
240. Id. at 484. The amount of the award to the plaintiff was $450,000 which was to be paid by
the defendants: the three doctors, the hospital and the manufacturer of the surgical instrument. Id.
241. Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 387 A.2d 480, 490 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
242. Id. at 490.
243. Flynn v. Langfitt, 710 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 835 (Revised ed. 1975). Meningitis is defined
as an inflammation of the meninges, or of the three membranes investing the brain and spinal cord.
Id.
247. Flynn, 710 F. Supp. at 150.
248. Id. at 152.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied,
569 A.2d 1368 (Pa. 1989).
252. Id. at 895, 896.
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jurisdictions 3 and finally held that the defendant hospital was not
strictly liable to the plaintiff because the hospital was not in the business
of selling the instrument.' The hospital acted primarily to provide
medical services and the use of the instrument was only incidental to this
goal . "
The Podrat court distinguished the case of Thomas v. St. Joseph
Hospital,' where the court applied strict liability against a hospital
when a plaintiff's hospital gown ignited after he dropped a lighted
match.257 The court reasoned that strict liability would apply where the
product was defective apart from the professional services connected with
its use.' However, if the hospital used the defective product in
providing medical services, then the hospital could avoid strict
liability. 9  In that instance, strict liability would not be imposed
because the hospital would be selling services, not products." In
Thomas, the hospital gown did not relate to the essential professional
relationship between the hospital and the patient.26  The court
therefore permitted the imposition of strict liability.2"
In 1989, a federal court heard another case involving the
interpretation of Pennsylvania's law regarding hospital liability for
injuries resulting from use of defective products." The Karibjanian
court considered the liability of a hospital for the death of one of its
patients caused by an injection of a defective contrast medium during a
medical procedure.2' In Karibjanian, the plaintiff alleged that the
253. Id. at 896, 897. The court relied on Silverhart, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 187, Magrine, 241 A.2d at
637, and Hector, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 595, in determining whether the hospital could be strictly liable
under § 402A. In each of the above cases the courts refused to impose liability since the hospital
was characterized as a seller of services and not of products.
254. Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 569
A.2d 1368 (Pa. 1989).
255. Id. at 897.
256. 618 S.W.2d 791 (rex. Civ. App. 1981).
257. Podrat, 558 A.2d at897;seealsoNevauexv. Park Place Hosp. Inc., 656 S.W.2d 923 (rex.
Ct. App. 1983) (where strict liability was held not to attach to a hospital when a patient is injured
by radiation therapy even if the therapy is a product because it is "intimately and inseparably"
connected with the professional services provided).




262. Id. at 897.
263. Karibjanian v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 717 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
264. Id. at 1082-1083. The opinion states that the defective substance was Thorotrast, a form of
thorium dioxide, which was injected during a cerebral arteriography. Id. It then defines a cerebral
arteriography as "visualization of an artery or arteries by x-rays after injection of a radiopaque
contrast medium." Id.
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contrast medium administered to the decedent was defective and that the
hospital should be strictly liable for the sale of the product.265 The
court thought that the sale of the contrast medium fell within section
402A, as explained by comment f,2" and stated:
There are, I think, significant data which suggest Pennsylvania's
Supreme Court would in some circumstances hold a hospital liable
under § 402A as a seller of a product like Thorotrast, if it is the
product itself rather than the procedure by which it was administered
which is alleged to have been defective."6
Therefore, the court refused to dismiss the strict liability claim.2 s
The court's refusal to dismiss the claim was substantiated by evidence
indicating that the hospital was a seller of the contrast medium for
purposes of section 402A. 2"
The cases discussed thus far involve the applicability of strict
liability and breach of implied warranty claims to hospitals for the sale
of defective products. Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,270 the next
Pennsylvania case based on section 402A, is dissimilar from these cases
because it concerns the liability of a pharmacist for the sale of a
defective drug.27' In Coyle, plaintiff's infant child had malformed
limbs.272 The plaintiffs alleged that the deformity was caused by a
drug prescribed to the mother of the infant. 73 The plaintiffs sued the
drug manufacturer and the pharmacists who supplied the drug.274 The
court declined to extend strict liability to pharmacists who supply a
defective drug,275 and based its decision on comment k of section
402A.276 In its analysis, the court stressed that the law restricts
distribution of prescription drugs.2' Thus, the patient relies on the
265. Id. at 1083. The plaintiff alleges that the hospital knew or should have known that Thorotrast
(the contrast medium) was an inherently unsafe product. Id.
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. f, supra note 136. The court specifically
stated that comment f does not distinguish between suppliers of goods who also supply services, and
those who only supply goods. Karibjanian, 717 F. Supp. at 1085.
267. Karibjanian, 717 F. Supp. at 1085.
268. Id. at 1086.
269. Id. at 1086. The facts pointing to such a sale are that the hospital stocked the Thorotrast in
inventory and that the hospital regularly supplied Thorotrast to other patients. Id.
270. Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1384 (Pa. 1991).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1384.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387.
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k, supra note 147.
277. Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1386.
99 DICKINSON LAW REvIEw WImER 1995
expertise of the doctor who prescribes the drug rather than the
pharmacist who carries out a doctor's order. 78 It is the physician, not
the pharmacist, who makes the product available to the public.
279
Second, the court determined that holding pharmacists to strict liability
could not serve as an incentive to safety.' The court reasoned that
pharmacists cannot ignore the physician's order and dispense a drug
other than the one prescribed by the physician."' Finally, the effect
of imposing strict liability on pharmacists would discourage them from
filling prescriptions even though a drug may be necessary to a patient's
health. 2' For these reasons, the court held that pharmacists are
exempted from the general rule of strict supplier liability.'
The last and most recent Pennsylvania case to examine the issue of
hospital liability in a hybrid transaction case is Stephenson v .
Greenburg.2 Unlike the Pennsylvania case law thus far discussed,
Stephenson is based on breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. 285  The claim stemmed from injuries that the
plaintiff incurred from a drug administered to her in treatment of a
ruptured ovarian cyst. 286 Specifically, the issue was whether a hospital
may be held liable as a merchant under the UCC when it administers a
drug during the course of treatment.' The court relied on case law
from other jurisdictions in reaching the conclusion that the hospital did
not amount to a merchant and that the administration of the drug did not
constitute a transaction in goods governed by the UCC.7 The court
also held that the language of the implied warranty provision is
inapplicable for two reasons .219 First, the primary function of the
hospital is to heal,29' not to sell goods.91 Second, the goods
furnished during a hospital stay are incidental to the medical services
received .292




282. Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387.
283. Id.
284. Stephenson v. Greenberg, 617 A.2d 364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 633 A.2d 153
(Pa. 1993).
285. Id. at 365. UCC § 2-315, supra note 100.
286. Id. at 364, 365.
287. Id. at 368.
288. Id. at 369.





The lack of uniformity among Hoffman, Grubb, Flynn, Podrat,
Karibjanian, Coyle, and Stephenson makes the issue of hospital liability
for the sale of defective breast implants very unpredictable. When a
Pennsylvania court is first presented with the issue of whether a hospital
should be held strictly liable for the sale of defective implants, it will
have little precedential guidance in reaching a conclusion. Absent Coyle,
each of the above cases involve hybrid transactions and hospital liability,
and thus, the court will look to them for support in answering the
question. However, a court's attempt to understand this case law in a
logical fashion will likely end in exasperation.
The case law is troubling for several reasons. First, federal court
decisions interpret Pennsylvania law differently. 2" Second, even cases
with the same fact patterns reach antithetical conclusions. For instance,
although both Podrat and Grubb involve a hospital's use of a defective
surgical instrument they have contrary outcomes." 9 The Grubb court
favored imposing strict liability on the hospital, whereas the Podrat court
refused to apply the theory.295 Third, Hoffman's ruling allowing a
claim against a hospital based on implied warranty of fitness for the sale
of "bad". blood is no longer good law. 2" Four years after Hoffman,
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute limiting hospital liability in
blood transfusion cases to negligence actions.2"
Despite the gross inconsistencies in this body of law, Pennsylvania
courts soon will be challenged to decide the issue of whether to impose
liability on a hospital for placing defective implants in women.2" The
material presented in Part III of this Comment suggests that one outcome
293. See Karibjanian, 717 F. Supp. at 1081 (indicating that a hospital may be strictly liable for
sale of defective product); But cf. Flynn v. Langfitt, 710 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (indicating
that hospital cannot be held strictly liable where Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet spoken on
the issue).
294. See Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied,
569 A.2d 1368 (Pa. 1989) (denying patient's strict liability claim against the hospital); But cf.
Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 387 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), 387 A.2d at 480
(allowing a charge to the jury that it could find defendant hospital liable under 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts).
295. Podrat, 558 A.2d at 895; Grubb, 387 A.2d at 480.
296. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp. of Philadelphia, 267 A.2d at 867 (Pa. 1970) (superseded by
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8333 (1978).
297. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8333 (1978).
298. Interview with James Ronca, supra note 16. Approximately 200 breast implant cases have
been filed in Pennsylvania. Id. All pre-trial matters in these state claims are currently being heard
by a three-judge panel in Philadelphia. Id. On November 9, 1993 the judges made a final ruling
on the case management and procedures for handling these implant claims. Id. However, these
judges will not preside over the actual trials; rather each case will be litigated in its respective
county. Id.
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is far superior to the other. Courts imposing strict liability or liability
based on breach of implied warranty on hospitals for the sale of silicone
implants act in both a warranted and easily justified manner.
Pennsylvania courts should adopt the position that hospitals are
"sellers" of breast implants.' As stated previously, evidence indicates
that hospitals are "sellers."' For instance, any sale involves the
transfer of a good for a price?" Here, the breast implant is physically
transferred from the hospital to the patient. Additionally, the hospital
charges the patient specifically for the cost of the implant.' Also, the
general goal of sellers is to make profits. Hospitals often profit from the
mark up of the sale of the implant?" Finally, like any business,
hospitals increase sales through advertisements. Surgeons advertise to
women the benefits of cosmetic surgery, such as breast
augmentation.' Hospitals benefit from these advertisements in the
form of increased sales, and in turn increased profits. All of these
factors indicate that a sale occurs in this transaction and that hospitals are
"sellers" of breast implants. Moreover, in the case of breast implants,
hospitals furnish products as opposed to services.
Once the court establishes that a hospital is a seller of a product,
breast implants, then courts can impose strict liability and breach of
implied warranty. 5  Not only would imposing strict liability on
hospitals be justified as a matter of law, it would also be justified based
on public policy. Pennsylvania courts should allow for this liability
because it will further the traditional goal of strict liability by ensuring
that injuries born by the product do not fall on the consumer. As
participants in the stream of commerce, who benefit from the sale of
299. Ford v. McGhan Medical Corp., et al., No. 135, slip op. at 15 (C.P. Ct. of Philadelphia
County, Sept. 7, 1993). In Ford, the Pennsylvania Coordinating Court for Silicone Implant
Litigation dismissed a patient's strict liability claim against a health care provider for the sale of
defective implants. Id. The court did not deem the health care provider a "seller" of the implants.
Id. Likewise, the panel dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the health care provider based on
implied warranties of the UCC. Id. at 17. However, the court recognized that health care providers
could be liable under negligence theory if they failed to exercise reasonable care in the selection and
inspection of the implants. Id. at 11.
300. See supra pp. 17-21.
301. See supra notes 58 & 174 and accompanying text.
302. Interview with James Ronca, supra note 16.
303. Id. There is no specific data indicating the amount of profits Pennsylvania hospitals derive
from the sale of silicone implants. This lack of information is largely attributed to the imposition
of a stay prohibiting discovery in these suits. Id. Imposed by the Coordinating Court for Silicone
Implant Litigation, the stay will be lifted December 1, 1993. Id.
304. See supra note 224.
305. See supra notes 29, 30 & 100.
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breast implants, hospitals must share in the corresponding losses caused
by defective implants.
V. Conclusion
This Comment sets forth several propositions. The principal one
being that a hospital is a "seller" of breast implants. As a seller of
breast implants, strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims
attach to the sale. Thus, as a matter of law, hospitals may be held liable
under either of these theories for the sale of defective silicone breast
implants. It is also proposed that extending these claims of liability to
hospitals is in harmony with public policy and traditional goals of strict
liability.
Thousands of women have been injured by silicone breast
implants. They may suffer from arthritis, constant fatigue or
diseases such as lupus. 1  As with any products liability suit, plaintiffs
seek redress from those individuals responsible for the sale of the
defective product. Hospitals are active participants in the chain of
distribution of breast implants, and therefore should share in the cost of
compensating victims of defective implants.
Kristin B. Meyer
306. See supra notes 11-142.
307. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

